voidly
Data

Country profile · DK

Denmark.

A closer look at internet access.
The score, the signals, the source.

30-day index score

1/100

A dated sample-based score. Higher values indicate more interference in the index model.

Measurements in window
741
Original snapshot rank
Unranked

Snapshot fetched

Outside the scored OONI profile

Understand the backdrop.

Available source records for Denmark are shown with their dates and measurement limits. An absent score does not imply unrestricted internet access.

This source branch has no complete scored OONI editorial profile. Current incident and model sources remain independently available.

Country narrative, score basis and historical source

The original site falls back to the country API and incident records for Denmark. No unique OONI editorial narrative is available in that branch.

Editorial text is preserved as source context. Product recommendations do not guarantee unrestricted access. The source tier may differ from the measured score because the two have different definitions.

Score window: 30 days. Snapshot fetched . Content first seen . Upstream serve-time . These timestamps do not date the all-time OONI observations.

All-time measurements accumulate from an older source file without an observation window or timestamp. The all-time blocked ratio is not the confidence-shrunk score. Zero counts and absent fields are kept distinct.

All-time measurement archive

Accumulated measurements
Unavailable
Flagged blocked in archive
Unavailable
All-time blocked / total
Unavailable

No historical protocol breakdown in this snapshot.

No collection date or complete-country coverage claim is attached to this archive. Protocol fields can be incomplete and need not sum to the historical total.

Country incident records

Start with an observation.

All country records
2 source records · 2 returned hereGenerated
  1. Internet connectivity disruption in Denmark

    ioda · DK-2026-0002

    5 source measurements · incident confidence 70.0%

    Record description

    IODA detected significant connectivity drop in Denmark. 5 critical alerts recorded.

    Type disruptionStatus activeSeverity critical
  2. Internet connectivity disruption in Denmark

    ioda · DK-2026-0001

    3 source measurements · incident confidence 67.0%

    Record description

    IODA detected significant connectivity drop in Denmark. 3 critical alerts recorded.

    Type disruptionStatus activeSeverity critical

Statuses come from each record; “active” is not inferred from severity or an absent end date. Incident confidence is a source field, not independent certainty that censorship occurred.

Evidence sources, query scope and dates
  • ioda: named by 2 returned incident records

This is the source mix in the latest returned incident sample, not independent corroboration of the country score. A record can name multiple sources; the counts can overlap.

Dataset version: 2026.09.08. Malformed rows omitted: 0. All readable returned records appear above; each links to its complete evidence and citation page.

Measurement context

Know what is observed.

Quality methods

Current country response

Source branch
OONI response
OONI measurements
847
Sample anomaly rate
0.8%
Source confirmed-rate field
0.0%
Measurement source updated

An anomaly is a measurement result requiring interpretation. These country API fields use a different basis from the dated, confidence-shrunk index score.

Country API basis and complete response

Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "@context": "https://schema.org",
  "@type": "Country",
  "name": "Denmark",
  "identifier": "DK",
  "url": "https://voidly.ai/censorship-index/dk",
  "additionalProperty": [
    {
      "@type": "PropertyValue",
      "name": "Censorship Score",
      "value": 1,
      "description": "0-100 scale where 100 = total internet censorship"
    },
    {
      "@type": "PropertyValue",
      "name": "Anomaly Rate",
      "value": 0.008264462809917356
    },
    {
      "@type": "PropertyValue",
      "name": "Measurement Count",
      "value": 847
    }
  ],
  "data": {
    "country": "DK",
    "name": "Denmark",
    "flag": "🇩🇰",
    "region": "Europe",
    "timestamp": "2026-09-08T20:06:07.647Z",
    "status": "free",
    "score": 1,
    "categoryScores": {},
    "blockedSites": [],
    "affectedServices": [],
    "voidlyProbes": {
      "total": 0,
      "successful": 0,
      "blocked": 0
    },
    "ooni": {
      "status": "normal",
      "anomalyRate": 0.008264462809917356,
      "confirmedRate": 0,
      "measurementCount": 847,
      "affectedServices": [],
      "lastUpdated": "2026-09-08T15:21:25.097Z"
    },
    "activeIncidents": []
  },
  "dataSource": "live_ooni",
  "source": "Voidly Global Censorship Index",
  "lastUpdated": "2026-09-08T20:06:07.913Z"
}

Country measurement quality

Measurement confidence
52/100 · medium
30-day source measurements
740
Distinct measured domains
378
Reported source count
1
Hours since measured
404.1

Quality measures evidence confidence, not censorship probability. A small or absent sample cannot establish country-wide access. Quality generated: .

Quality source
Country-origin probes and global network status

Country-origin probe records: Unavailable. Flagged in that sample: Unavailable (Unavailable).

Global core + community active nodes: 40. Core active nodes: 15. Global probes in the last 24 hours: 145,077. Network source updated: .

Global infrastructure totals do not prove that this country was tested from every location. A node’s reported status and country reflect network infrastructure, not national internet freedom.

No country-origin nodes were returned in this network response.

Model outlook

Read the horizon.

Drivers & similar episodes

7-day event probability

24.1%

A censorship or connectivity event within seven days of the model’s as-of date, relative to the country’s baseline. It does not predict an exact shutdown date or measure standing freedom.

Model: honest_forecast_v1
Model as-of date:
Source decision threshold: 62.5%

7-day model, legacy trajectory and full source

Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

fixed in-sample model confidence, NOT a per-forecast calibrated probability

Use for cross-country RISK RANKING, not precise within-country day-of-shutdown timing.

This forecast scores the ONSET of a new recorded incident, not how censored a country already is. A permanently and stably blocked network generates no new anomaly, so it scores LOW. Measured 2026-07-31: China 0.015 and India 0.023 both rank BELOW Denmark 0.062 — China is probed 30/30 days across 836 domains and has logged nothing for 71 days, while Denmark is probed 2/30 days. A low score here means 'no CHANGE expected', never 'this country is free'. For standing severity use /v1/atlas/score-v2 or the censorship index instead.

Training ROC AUC 0.954 came from a RANDOM stratified split (consecutive country-days in an incident window are near-duplicates, inflating it). No target leakage: features use [date-7,date], label uses [date+1,date+7].

~0.85-0.90 (dual-holdout temporal gate)

ML_LEAKAGE_AUDIT.md (forecast v1/7day row).

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "aci": {
    "active": true,
    "alpha": 0.048,
    "empirical_coverage": 0.8979,
    "last_updated": "2026-09-08T03:45:02.132824+00:00",
    "n_observations": 2518,
    "q_applied": 0.35,
    "q_raw": 0.9762
  },
  "aci_alpha": 0.048,
  "confidence": 0.85,
  "country": "DK",
  "country_name": "Denmark",
  "covered": true,
  "forecast": [
    {
      "date": "2026-09-08",
      "day": 0,
      "drivers": [],
      "risk": 0.01
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-09-09",
      "day": 1,
      "drivers": [],
      "risk": 0.01
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-09-10",
      "day": 2,
      "drivers": [],
      "risk": 0.01
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-09-11",
      "day": 3,
      "drivers": [],
      "risk": 0.029
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-09-12",
      "day": 4,
      "drivers": [],
      "risk": 0.01
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-09-13",
      "day": 5,
      "drivers": [],
      "risk": 0.01
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-09-14",
      "day": 6,
      "drivers": [],
      "risk": 0.049
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-09-15",
      "day": 7,
      "drivers": [],
      "risk": 0.02
    }
  ],
  "forecast_trajectory_note": "summary.max_risk is now the independently-validated honest 7-day event probability. The per-day forecast[] trajectory is the legacy v1 illustrative shape (NOT independently validated) — use honest_forecast for the headline; the v1 value is kept as max_risk_v1_leaky.",
  "generated_at": "2026-09-08T20:06:08.435644",
  "honest_caveat": {
    "confidence_is": "fixed in-sample model confidence, NOT a per-forecast calibrated probability",
    "correct_use": "Use for cross-country RISK RANKING, not precise within-country day-of-shutdown timing.",
    "detects_change_not_state": "This forecast scores the ONSET of a new recorded incident, not how censored a country already is. A permanently and stably blocked network generates no new anomaly, so it scores LOW. Measured 2026-07-31: China 0.015 and India 0.023 both rank BELOW Denmark 0.062 — China is probed 30/30 days across 836 domains and has logged nothing for 71 days, while Denmark is probed 2/30 days. A low score here means 'no CHANGE expected', never 'this country is free'. For standing severity use /v1/atlas/score-v2 or the censorship index instead.",
    "headline_auc_note": "Training ROC AUC 0.954 came from a RANDOM stratified split (consecutive country-days in an incident window are near-duplicates, inflating it). No target leakage: features use [date-7,date], label uses [date+1,date+7].",
    "honest_temporal_holdout_auc": "~0.85-0.90 (dual-holdout temporal gate)",
    "live_forward_accountability": [
      "GET /v1/sentinel/accuracy (rolling 30-day precision/recall; currently self-reported degraded)",
      "GET /v1/forecast/onset-skill (honest onset / forward skill)"
    ],
    "source": "ML_LEAKAGE_AUDIT.md (forecast v1/7day row)."
  },
  "honest_forecast": {
    "as_of": "2026-09-07",
    "flag": false,
    "is_headline_source": true,
    "probability": 0.2408,
    "recommended_threshold": 0.625,
    "risk_band": "low",
    "semantics": "probability of a censorship/connectivity EVENT in the next 7 days (country-relative z-score label)",
    "validation": "Independent OONI-grounded + leakage-free. Rolling-origin AUC ~0.815, PR-AUC ~0.29; beats persistence/climatology in all 9 temporal folds; LOCO beats persistence 49/51 countries. See /v1/forecast/honest/info."
  },
  "interval_90": [
    0,
    0.39899999999999997
  ],
  "model_version": "honest_forecast_v1",
  "summary": {
    "avg_risk": 0.018,
    "key_drivers": [],
    "max_risk": 0.2408,
    "max_risk_day": 6,
    "max_risk_v1_leaky": 0.049
  },
  "top_features": [
    {
      "contribution": -0.0245,
      "direction": "down",
      "name": "week_of_year",
      "source": "model"
    },
    {
      "contribution": -0.0174,
      "direction": "down",
      "name": "block_rate_roll7_mean",
      "source": "model"
    },
    {
      "contribution": 0.0162,
      "direction": "up",
      "name": "block_rate_roll7_std",
      "source": "model"
    }
  ],
  "top_features_per_day": [
    {
      "base_prob": 0.0038,
      "date": "2026-09-08",
      "day": 0,
      "risk": 0.01,
      "top_features": [
        {
          "contribution": -0.0245,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "week_of_year",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": -0.0174,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_mean",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": 0.0162,
          "direction": "up",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_std",
          "source": "model"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "base_prob": 0.0038,
      "date": "2026-09-09",
      "day": 1,
      "risk": 0.01,
      "top_features": [
        {
          "contribution": -0.0245,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "week_of_year",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": -0.0174,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_mean",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": 0.0162,
          "direction": "up",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_std",
          "source": "model"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "base_prob": 0.0038,
      "date": "2026-09-10",
      "day": 2,
      "risk": 0.01,
      "top_features": [
        {
          "contribution": -0.0245,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "week_of_year",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": -0.0174,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_mean",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": 0.0162,
          "direction": "up",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_std",
          "source": "model"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "base_prob": 0.0038,
      "date": "2026-09-11",
      "day": 3,
      "risk": 0.029,
      "top_features": [
        {
          "contribution": -0.0245,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "week_of_year",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": -0.0174,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_mean",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": 0.0162,
          "direction": "up",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_std",
          "source": "model"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "base_prob": 0.0038,
      "date": "2026-09-12",
      "day": 4,
      "risk": 0.01,
      "top_features": [
        {
          "contribution": -0.0245,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "week_of_year",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": 0.02,
          "direction": "up",
          "name": "day_decay_t+4",
          "source": "overlay"
        },
        {
          "contribution": -0.0174,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_mean",
          "source": "model"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "base_prob": 0.0038,
      "date": "2026-09-13",
      "day": 5,
      "risk": 0.01,
      "top_features": [
        {
          "contribution": 0.025,
          "direction": "up",
          "name": "day_decay_t+5",
          "source": "overlay"
        },
        {
          "contribution": -0.0245,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "week_of_year",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": -0.0174,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_mean",
          "source": "model"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "base_prob": 0.0038,
      "date": "2026-09-14",
      "day": 6,
      "risk": 0.049,
      "top_features": [
        {
          "contribution": 0.03,
          "direction": "up",
          "name": "day_decay_t+6",
          "source": "overlay"
        },
        {
          "contribution": -0.0245,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "week_of_year",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": -0.0174,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_mean",
          "source": "model"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "base_prob": 0.0038,
      "date": "2026-09-15",
      "day": 7,
      "risk": 0.02,
      "top_features": [
        {
          "contribution": 0.035,
          "direction": "up",
          "name": "day_decay_t+7",
          "source": "overlay"
        },
        {
          "contribution": -0.0245,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "week_of_year",
          "source": "model"
        },
        {
          "contribution": -0.0174,
          "direction": "down",
          "name": "block_rate_roll7_mean",
          "source": "model"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}
Legacy daily illustration · 8 points

The returned daily shape belongs to legacy v1. It is not independently validated and does not describe the honest 7-day headline model above. Its peak day, fixed confidence and interval must not be attached to that headline.

summary.max_risk is now the independently-validated honest 7-day event probability. The per-day forecast[] trajectory is the legacy v1 illustrative shape (NOT independently validated) — use honest_forecast for the headline; the v1 value is kept as max_risk_v1_leaky.

DateLegacy valueSource drivers
2026-09-081.0%
2026-09-091.0%
2026-09-101.0%
2026-09-112.9%
2026-09-121.0%
2026-09-131.0%
2026-09-144.9%
2026-09-152.0%
Legacy forecast evaluation

Original display confidence field: 85.0%. The source describes this as fixed in-sample model confidence, not calibrated per-forecast certainty.

Three horizons. Visible uncertainty.

Separate multi-horizon model. Each mark is the point estimate; its bar is the source’s 90% conformal interval.

1d

36.4% · 90% interval 26.7%–46.1%

7d

35.6% · 90% interval 16.9%–54.4%

30d

70.0% · 90% interval 20.0%–100.0%

Model: multi-horizon-h-v1. Longer-horizon intervals can be very wide; these estimates do not support precise within-country timing.

Source consistency: within the model’s monotonicity tolerance.

Per-horizon breakdown
Multi-horizon limitations, features and source

Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

AUC (e.g. 1d ~0.91) OVERSTATES usefulness — per-horizon F1 is much lower (~0.45 at 1d) because shutdown-positive days are rare and the 7/30-day target is a sliding window that is highly autocorrelated day-to-day (a leakage-prone label).

Conformal bands widen sharply at 30d (often ~[0.45, 1.0]) — the 30d point estimate is low-confidence.

Use for cross-country RISK RANKING within the watched panel, NOT precise within-country day-of-shutdown timing. Data-backed for covered countries only (see the 'covered' flag).

This forecast scores the ONSET of a new recorded incident, not how censored a country already is. A permanently and stably blocked network generates no new anomaly, so it scores LOW. Measured 2026-07-31: China 0.015 and India 0.023 both rank BELOW Denmark 0.062 — China is probed 30/30 days across 836 domains and has logged nothing for 71 days, while Denmark is probed 2/30 days. A low score here means 'no CHANGE expected', never 'this country is free'. For standing severity use /v1/atlas/score-v2 or the censorship index instead.

Per-horizon AUC is leave-one-country-out on the SPOTLIGHT (watched) panel, NOT all 130 countries; see /v1/forecast/multi-horizon/info for the per-horizon F1.

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "consistency": {
    "monotonic": true,
    "violations": []
  },
  "country": "DK",
  "country_name": "Denmark",
  "covered": true,
  "generated_at": "2026-09-08T20:06:08.465126",
  "honest_caveat": {
    "auc_caveat": "AUC (e.g. 1d ~0.91) OVERSTATES usefulness — per-horizon F1 is much lower (~0.45 at 1d) because shutdown-positive days are rare and the 7/30-day target is a sliding window that is highly autocorrelated day-to-day (a leakage-prone label).",
    "conformal_caveat": "Conformal bands widen sharply at 30d (often ~[0.45, 1.0]) — the 30d point estimate is low-confidence.",
    "correct_use": "Use for cross-country RISK RANKING within the watched panel, NOT precise within-country day-of-shutdown timing. Data-backed for covered countries only (see the 'covered' flag).",
    "detects_change_not_state": "This forecast scores the ONSET of a new recorded incident, not how censored a country already is. A permanently and stably blocked network generates no new anomaly, so it scores LOW. Measured 2026-07-31: China 0.015 and India 0.023 both rank BELOW Denmark 0.062 — China is probed 30/30 days across 836 domains and has logged nothing for 71 days, while Denmark is probed 2/30 days. A low score here means 'no CHANGE expected', never 'this country is free'. For standing severity use /v1/atlas/score-v2 or the censorship index instead.",
    "metrics_are": "Per-horizon AUC is leave-one-country-out on the SPOTLIGHT (watched) panel, NOT all 130 countries; see /v1/forecast/multi-horizon/info for the per-horizon F1."
  },
  "honest_horizons": [
    "1d",
    "30d",
    "7d"
  ],
  "horizons": {
    "1d": {
      "conformal_90": {
        "halfwidth": 0.0968,
        "lower": 0.2672,
        "upper": 0.4608
      },
      "horizon": "1d",
      "horizon_days": 1,
      "probability": 0.364,
      "top_features": [
        {
          "feature": "week_of_year",
          "shap_value": -0.918269693851471
        },
        {
          "feature": "risk_tier",
          "shap_value": -0.16309301555156708
        },
        {
          "feature": "day_of_week",
          "shap_value": -0.12515908479690552
        },
        {
          "feature": "block_rate_roll30_mean",
          "shap_value": 0.1049027293920517
        },
        {
          "feature": "month",
          "shap_value": -0.08115064352750778
        }
      ]
    },
    "30d": {
      "conformal_90": {
        "halfwidth": 0.5,
        "lower": 0.1999,
        "upper": 1
      },
      "horizon": "30d",
      "horizon_days": 30,
      "probability": 0.6999,
      "top_features": [
        {
          "feature": "week_of_year",
          "shap_value": -0.8641365170478821
        },
        {
          "feature": "risk_tier",
          "shap_value": -0.17295654118061066
        },
        {
          "feature": "month",
          "shap_value": -0.08295320719480515
        },
        {
          "feature": "recent_shutdown",
          "shap_value": -0.07376516610383987
        },
        {
          "feature": "gdelt_unrest_30d",
          "shap_value": -0.059335555881261826
        }
      ]
    },
    "7d": {
      "conformal_90": {
        "halfwidth": 0.1875,
        "lower": 0.1689,
        "upper": 0.5439
      },
      "horizon": "7d",
      "horizon_days": 7,
      "probability": 0.3564,
      "top_features": [
        {
          "feature": "week_of_year",
          "shap_value": -0.6334878206253052
        },
        {
          "feature": "risk_tier",
          "shap_value": -0.1946467161178589
        },
        {
          "feature": "month",
          "shap_value": -0.18171259760856628
        },
        {
          "feature": "block_rate_roll30_mean",
          "shap_value": 0.06162860244512558
        },
        {
          "feature": "gdelt_unrest_30d",
          "shap_value": -0.05638951435685158
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "model_version": "multi-horizon-h-v1"
}

Model evaluation and labels differ. Honest 7-day model · Multi-horizon evaluation. An API response date is not the date of the underlying training data.

Additional signals

More context. Separate models.

Model changelog

Each source answers a different question. Missing signals stay visible.

Voidly composite score

Unavailable

Separate from the index score. A weighted signal composite; sparse evidence can pull it toward zero.

Source freshness is unknown.

Date unavailable

Score method
Source, dates and limitations

Source generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

Open the source response

Conditional incident duration

205 median days

Scenario: a critical censorship incident in Denmark. This is not a timer for an existing incident.

Source interquartile range: 5372 days.

Exploratory · source model is below its promotion threshold.

Model trained: . Censoring in training data: 78.4%.

Duration assumptions, request and source

Source generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

  • model below promote floor (c=0.55, n=343) — treat as exploratory
  • censoring rate in training set: 78%

This read-only inference endpoint requires a POST request:

POST https://api.voidly.ai/v1/forecast/duration
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "country": "DK",
  "severity": "critical",
  "incident_type": "censorship"
}

API documentation

Complete returned record
{
  "country": "DK",
  "features_used": {
    "continent_Africa": 0,
    "continent_Americas": 0,
    "continent_Asia": 0,
    "continent_Europe": 1,
    "continent_Oceania": 0,
    "country_risk_tier": 5,
    "first_seen_month": 9,
    "first_seen_year": 2026,
    "prior_shutdowns_count_24mo": 0,
    "severity_critical": 1,
    "severity_warning": 0,
    "type_censorship": 1,
    "type_mixed": 0
  },
  "honest_caveats": [
    "model below promote floor (c=0.55, n=343) — treat as exploratory",
    "censoring rate in training set: 78%"
  ],
  "incident_type": "censorship",
  "iqr_days": 367,
  "median_days": 205,
  "median_hours": 4920,
  "model": {
    "censoring_rate": 0.7842565597667639,
    "class": "RandomSurvivalForest",
    "feature_names": [
      "country_risk_tier",
      "first_seen_year",
      "first_seen_month",
      "prior_shutdowns_count_24mo",
      "continent_Africa",
      "continent_Americas",
      "continent_Asia",
      "continent_Europe",
      "continent_Oceania",
      "severity_critical",
      "severity_warning",
      "type_censorship",
      "type_mixed"
    ],
    "name": "shutdown_duration_rsf_v1",
    "trained_at": "2026-05-21T12:01:30.451711Z"
  },
  "model_c_index": 0.5455,
  "n_training_samples": 343,
  "p25_hours": 120,
  "p75_hours": 8928,
  "promoted": false,
  "severity": "critical",
  "survival_curve_summary": [
    {
      "hours": 72,
      "survival_prob": 0.9
    },
    {
      "hours": 120,
      "survival_prob": 0.75
    },
    {
      "hours": 4920,
      "survival_prob": 0.5
    },
    {
      "hours": 8928,
      "survival_prob": 0.25
    },
    {
      "hours": 17880,
      "survival_prob": 0.1
    }
  ]
}

Contagion follow-risk

Follower estimate unavailable.

Trigger attribution is probabilistic, not causal. Noisy-OR aggregation can overstate risk when triggers share a cause.

Source, dates and limitations

Source generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

Open the source response

Behavioral neighbors

Similarity of measured blocking patterns, not governments or intent. Sparse feature coverage lowers confidence.

Source, dates and limitations

Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

Similarity here is BEHAVIORAL, not political. Two countries are near each other because they BLOCK in similar ways — comparable method mix, target categories and temporal shape — which does NOT imply comparable governments, laws or intent. A stable democracy with seasonal sports-piracy blocks can sit near an authoritarian state if their measured blocking footprints rhyme. Feature vectors are SPARSE for low-coverage countries (flagged sparse=true, <3 of 5 behavioral feature families populated) — their neighbors are dominated by regime/continent/cohort one-hots and should be read with low confidence. The 2D graph projection (UMAP or PCA) compresses a 32-dimensional space to 2 and loses information — use the cosine `neighbors` list, not pixel distance in the projection, for any quantitative claim.

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "country": "DK",
  "generated_at": "2026-09-07T05:10:09.714350+00:00",
  "honest_caveat": "Similarity here is BEHAVIORAL, not political. Two countries are near each other because they BLOCK in similar ways — comparable method mix, target categories and temporal shape — which does NOT imply comparable governments, laws or intent. A stable democracy with seasonal sports-piracy blocks can sit near an authoritarian state if their measured blocking footprints rhyme. Feature vectors are SPARSE for low-coverage countries (flagged sparse=true, <3 of 5 behavioral feature families populated) — their neighbors are dominated by regime/continent/cohort one-hots and should be read with low confidence. The 2D graph projection (UMAP or PCA) compresses a 32-dimensional space to 2 and loses information — use the cosine `neighbors` list, not pixel distance in the projection, for any quantitative claim.",
  "method": "standardized-cosine + pca",
  "nearest": [
    {
      "continent": "Europe",
      "country": "AT",
      "risk_tier": 5,
      "similarity": 0.9971,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Europe",
      "country": "CH",
      "risk_tier": 5,
      "similarity": 0.9174,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Europe",
      "country": "IE",
      "risk_tier": 5,
      "similarity": 0.9,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Europe",
      "country": "PT",
      "risk_tier": 5,
      "similarity": 0.8676,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Europe",
      "country": "NO",
      "risk_tier": 5,
      "similarity": 0.8577,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Europe",
      "country": "CZ",
      "risk_tier": 5,
      "similarity": 0.791,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Europe",
      "country": "GR",
      "risk_tier": 3,
      "similarity": 0.7835,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Europe",
      "country": "BE",
      "risk_tier": 5,
      "similarity": 0.6671,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Americas",
      "country": "CL",
      "risk_tier": 4,
      "similarity": 0.5969,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Europe",
      "country": "BG",
      "risk_tier": 3,
      "similarity": 0.5654,
      "sparse": false
    }
  ],
  "query_meta": {
    "continent": "Europe",
    "country": "DK",
    "dtw_cohort": null,
    "evidence_count": 748,
    "feature_families_present": 3,
    "feature_families_total": 5,
    "risk_tier": 5,
    "sparse": false
  },
  "version": "v1"
}

Evidence grade distribution

A: 0B: 2C: 0F: 0

Grades are source rubric categories. They do not independently establish deliberate blocking.

Grading rubric
Source, dates and limitations

Source generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "distribution": {
    "A": 0,
    "B": 2,
    "C": 0,
    "F": 0
  },
  "filters": {
    "country": "DK",
    "incident_type": null
  },
  "rules": {
    "A": "else",
    "B": "n_sources >= 1 AND avg_confidence >= 0.7",
    "C": "n_sources >= 2 AND n_domains >= 3",
    "F": "duration_hours >= 24 AND n_sources >= 2"
  },
  "total": 2,
  "ungraded": 0
}

Measured circumvention results

No sufficiently covered headline recommendation is available.

Full measurement table
Required caveats, tool notes and complete results

Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

  • PROBE SUCCESS != REAL-USER SUCCESS. DPI vendors increasingly rate-limit real client traffic while letting OONI / Voidly synthetic measurement probes through. Success rates here are an UPPER BOUND on what a real user will see.
  • Recommendations can become stale within hours. Censorship adapts. If a try_first tool stops working, the next probe rotation (cron daily 06:00 UTC) will catch it but you will see it before we do.
  • 'Try first' is NOT 'safe'. It means 'highest measured success rate, highest probe confidence.' Operational security (unique device, throwaway account, no SIM, no DNS leak, etc.) is the USER's responsibility — none of that is captured here.
  • Domain-fronted tools (Snowflake, Lantern, Psiphon) are SYSTEMATICALLY UNDER-ESTIMATED. Bootstrap-domain probes do not measure the rotating tunnel endpoints those tools actually use.
  • Self-hosted WireGuard / OpenVPN on a private IP is INVISIBLE to OONI probes and is not represented here. If you have one, trust it over any commercial recommendation.
  • Tor rows roll up vanilla / obfs4 / Snowflake / Meek transports. Per-transport granularity needs raw OONI nettests, out of scope for v1.
  • DO NOT share this recommendation as a forum-shareable card without the caveat block. The do_not_share_card_without_caveats flag in the response is on by design.

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "country_code": "DK",
  "do_not_share_card_without_caveats": true,
  "endpoints": {
    "info": "/v1/atlas/circumvention/info",
    "upstream_evasion_table": "/v1/atlas/evasion/DK"
  },
  "generated_at": "2026-09-08T06:00:05.120012+00:00",
  "honest_caveats": [
    "PROBE SUCCESS != REAL-USER SUCCESS. DPI vendors increasingly rate-limit real client traffic while letting OONI / Voidly synthetic measurement probes through. Success rates here are an UPPER BOUND on what a real user will see.",
    "Recommendations can become stale within hours. Censorship adapts. If a try_first tool stops working, the next probe rotation (cron daily 06:00 UTC) will catch it but you will see it before we do.",
    "'Try first' is NOT 'safe'. It means 'highest measured success rate, highest probe confidence.' Operational security (unique device, throwaway account, no SIM, no DNS leak, etc.) is the USER's responsibility — none of that is captured here.",
    "Domain-fronted tools (Snowflake, Lantern, Psiphon) are SYSTEMATICALLY UNDER-ESTIMATED. Bootstrap-domain probes do not measure the rotating tunnel endpoints those tools actually use.",
    "Self-hosted WireGuard / OpenVPN on a private IP is INVISIBLE to OONI probes and is not represented here. If you have one, trust it over any commercial recommendation.",
    "Tor rows roll up vanilla / obfs4 / Snowflake / Meek transports. Per-transport granularity needs raw OONI nettests, out of scope for v1.",
    "DO NOT share this recommendation as a forum-shareable card without the caveat block. The do_not_share_card_without_caveats flag in the response is on by design."
  ],
  "informational_disclaimer": "This endpoint is informational, not a safety guarantee. Do not share as a forum-shareable card without the caveat block.",
  "insufficient_coverage": true,
  "lookback_days": 30,
  "n_tools_measured": 0,
  "n_total_probes": 0,
  "note": "No circumvention-tool probe measurements found for DK in the last 30 days. This usually means OONI probe coverage is absent in DK, NOT that every tool works. We cannot recommend anything for a country we cannot measure.",
  "schema": "voidly-circumvention-recommendation/v1",
  "tiers": {
    "avoid": [],
    "fallback": [],
    "try_first": []
  },
  "tools_ranked": []
}

Editorial service list

Know the named targets.

Undated editorial context. Check current evidence before treating a service as blocked.

No editorial blocked-service list is available in this source branch.

Check a specific domain

Country guidance

Keep alternatives ready.

The original country recommendations are preserved below. They are undated guidance, not a guarantee of access or safety.

  • Use a VPN to route traffic through an alternate network where available.
  • Use encrypted DNS (DoH or DoT).
  • Use secure messaging with end-to-end encryption.

Questions, answered

Denmark, in context.

Is the internet censored in Denmark?

The dated 30-day index score is 1/100. That describes the source sample, not every person, network or domain in Denmark.

Use the recent records and their original sources to investigate a particular restriction. Disruption alone does not establish intentional censorship.

Which websites and services are affected in Denmark?

There is no scored OONI editorial profile in this source branch. Use the dated incident evidence and domain checks for specific services.

Results can differ between networks, measurement times and targets. Country incident records and the country API preserve source details.

How recent is the data?

The index score snapshot was fetched . Its source serve-time can advance without changes in the underlying scores. The accumulating historical OONI file has no dated observation window.

Current country data, incidents, network state and models have independent source dates. The page requested those sources . It does not continuously refresh. Missing, stale and uncovered responses remain labeled.

Subscribe to source feeds
How can I check a specific domain in Denmark?

Open the accessibility checker. For a source query, use the country code with the domain you are investigating:

GET https://api.voidly.ai/v1/accessibility/check?domain=twitter.com&country=DK

MCP server: npx @voidly/mcp-server
Tool: check_domain_blocked
Arguments: domain="twitter.com", country="DK"

CLI: npx @voidly/cli check twitter.com DK

Inspect the returned timestamp, measurement coverage and method. A sampled result is not a guarantee for every user. API documentation · MCP tools.

How do I cite this Denmark profile?

Use the canonical country URL, https://voidly.ai/dk, with your access date and the date of any source snapshot you quote. The citation below supports plain text and BibTeX copy/download. A model generation or page access date is not a publication date.

Voidly-original analysis is CC BY 4.0. Upstream records keep their own attribution and licenses.

Open evidence

Keep the citation attached.

Country JSON
Download .txt
Voidly Research. (n.d.). Denmark Internet Censorship Profile. https://voidly.ai/dk (accessed 2026-09-08).

Citations use the public /dk URL. Access date is not publication date. Cite the individual source, observation time and model version when using a number.

Voidly-original analysis and annotations are CC BY 4.0. Upstream OONI, IODA and Censored Planet records retain their own licenses. Read and attribute the underlying evidence.