The dataset, over Tor
A second front door to the same public censorship data, for readers whose network blocks voidly.ai. It buys reachability, and that is the whole of what it buys.
Onion address
http://aockotxv6jtj6zruldhwikwoux7w7mpdxmjz2icassd6pc2b3xuo3lyd.onion/v1/censorship-indexOpen it in Tor Browser, or point any client at a local Tor SOCKS proxy. Use the full path, not the bare address: this door carries the machine-readable API, not the pages of this website, and it serves an allowlist — http://aockotxv6jtj6zruldhwikwoux7w7mpdxmjz2icassd6pc2b3xuo3lyd.onion/ returns 404, as does every HTML route this site has. Paths that answer are listed below.
The scheme is http, not https: an https URL on a v3 onion would need a certificate issued for the .onion name, which would publish that name to the public Certificate Transparency logs. The onion service key already authenticates and encrypts the connection.
What is behind the door
The free censorship observatory has a second front door at an onion address. It carries the public dataset and nothing else: the country index, the incident record, the evidence permalinks. Read-only, GET only. No account, no key, no email. Everything outside that list is refused at the door — anything that writes, anything that authenticates, anything that costs money.
The data is the same data
Fetched over Tor on 3 September 2026 (UTC), the index was byte-identical to the clearnet copy apart from 3 timestamp fields — 48,509 bytes on both sides, 130 countries, 350,644 measurements in the payload's own rolling 30-day live window (metadata.totalSamples, 3 September 2026), CC BY 4.0. That is one fetch pair inside one ingestion window, not a standing property: a pair straddling an ingest returns different country rows on each side, so re-fetch both rather than cite this.
Why an onion address
A name can be taken from you. A resolver can answer voidly.ai wrongly; a middlebox can read the server name in the opening handshake and reset the connection; a route can be dropped. An onion address has no name to look up and sends no server name in the clear. Reachability is the whole of what it buys.
What it does not do
Tor hides where you are asking from. It does not make this data private — it is public data under an open licence, and the request can be read at our end exactly as a clearnet request can. Nothing about Tor makes a payment private either: a payment on a public chain is a permanent public record. If your safety depends on nobody establishing that you paid Voidly, do not pay Voidly. The data is free.
It is also not a mirror. The door reverse-proxies the same origin the clearnet API uses and keeps no independent copy of the data, so once its cache expires, the door goes down with it. It does not fail the instant the origin does: a cached response keeps answering while the upstream is erroring, which is why a path can return 503 on one pass and 200 on the next.
What answers there
Every row fetched over Tor on 3 September 2026 (UTC), from a machine that is not the door.
| Path | Status | What it is |
|---|---|---|
| /v1/censorship-index | 200 | country index, the full dataset |
| /data/censorship-index.json | 200 | the same payload, data path |
| /data/incidents | 200 | the incident record |
| /data/meta | 200 | dataset version + endpoint discovery |
| /data/methodology | 200 | how every number is derived |
| /v1/atlas/changelog | 200 | model registry |
| /v1/pay/* | 404 | refused — the door carries data only |
| /admin | 404 | refused |
The refusals are the design, not an outage. The door serves an allowlist; everything else returns 404 there, including the payment surface.
Fetch it yourself
With Tor running locally, resolve the name through the proxy rather than through your own resolver. Re-derive the figures above instead of trusting them.
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://aockotxv6jtj6zruldhwikwoux7w7mpdxmjz2icassd6pc2b3xuo3lyd.onion/v1/censorship-index | wc -cExpect 48,509 bytes, give or take a day of data. The door answers GET only, so a HEAD or POST request is refused even on a path that otherwise answers.
Dataset licensed CC BY 4.0. The same terms apply however you reach it. Full catalogue on open data.
See also
- Censorship IndexPer-country score, blocked services, and risk tier — every country we track.
- FindingsAuto-generated, citable signals mined from the incident database every 6 hours.
- Reports & DigestsLive dashboard of recent activity: incidents, top countries, evidence sources.
- MethodologyHow we collect data, score countries, and validate the ML classifier.
- Open DataFree downloadable datasets, public APIs, and SDKs (CC BY 4.0).
- RSS / Atom / JSON FeedsSubscribe to incidents, findings, and AI-service status — push-friendly streams.
Cite this page
All Voidly Research data is licensed under CC BY 4.0. You can redistribute, remix, and build on it freely with attribution.