Voidly
Transparency · Probe network

The coverage gaps

Where our probes actually are

Voidly operates 16 probe nodes globally — but they're mostly in non-censoring countries. This page is the honest disclosure of where we DO have inside-country presence and where we DON'T, vs where censorship actually happens.

One more thing the count itself cannot tell you. The API splits the fleet into active_nodes (core) and everything else as community, but part of that community bucket is Voidly-run Fly.io machines that register through the same public path a volunteer's node does — nothing in the response separates them. Read the core figure as a floor on what Voidly operates and the community figure as a ceiling on genuine third-party participation. We publish what the endpoint can prove, not an internal tally it cannot corroborate.

Updated every 30 minutes from /v1/probe/network · CC BY 4.0

Total nodes
16
active probes
Countries covered
14
inside-country presence
Top-country coverage
0%
0/2401 incidents inside-covered
High-censorship gaps
28
countries without probes

The honest version

Our probe nodes are mostly hosted in places where it's easy to host probes — the US, UK, Germany, Japan, Singapore, India, Brazil, South Africa. Those vantage points are great for “is this domain reachable from outside” tests (which is how CensoredPlanet works), but they don't tell you what someone inside Iran or China actually sees.

For inside-country measurements, the Voidly Atlas relies on OONI (volunteer-run probes inside countries) and CensoredPlanet Satellite (remote DNS measurement technique that works for ~50 countries). The data we publish IS honest — but the “our probes verify censorship” claim is partially-true at best.

The fix is community probe operators inside censored regions. See /probes for the install path. Anyone with a Raspberry Pi, a VPS, or a spare laptop in one of the gap countries below can directly improve our ability to verify censorship from the inside.

Wanted: probe operators in these countries

High-censorship countries where we have no inside-country probe presence. Hosting a probe here would directly improve our coverage of the events that matter most.

2,401 incidents in the corpus come from these gap countries — currently verified via OONI volunteer probes + CensoredPlanet remote measurement.

Coverage of top-incident countries

The 10 countries with the most incidents in the Voidly corpus, sorted by incident count. The right column shows whether we have inside-country probe presence in each.

CountryIncidentsProbe
Russia RU310external only
Venezuela VE309external only
Iran IR299external only
Egypt EG249external only
Pakistan PK244external only
Azerbaijan AZ241external only
Myanmar MM241external only
Belarus BY170external only
AE AE169external only
Bangladesh BD169external only

Scroll to see every column.

Where we DO have probes (16 active)

NL7098/24h
Amsterdam
328 domains · 283 blocked
CA7082/24h
Toronto
412 domains · 435 blocked
JP7034/24h
Tokyo
352 domains · 297 blocked
MX7023/24h
Mexico City
380 domains · 314 blocked
SG6998/24h
Singapore
380 domains · 366 blocked
US6969/24h
New York
354 domains · 332 blocked
US6968/24h
Chicago
354 domains · 315 blocked
ES6952/24h
Madrid
300 domains · 265 blocked
GB6938/24h
London
305 domains · 279 blocked
KR6916/24h
Seoul
380 domains · 456 blocked
DE6913/24h
Frankfurt
380 domains · 621 blocked
IN6879/24h
Bangalore
380 domains · 271 blocked
BR6873/24h
São Paulo
453 domains · 365 blocked
AU6810/24h
Sydney
305 domains · 253 blocked
ZA6772/24h
Johannesburg
300 domains · 288 blocked
US0/24h
San Jose
0 domains

Host a probe (Pi, VPS, spare laptop)

The probe is a single-purpose process — rotates through the Citizen Lab test list and reports to api.voidly.ai/v1/probe/results over HMAC. Runs as a dedicated non-root user, uses pinned TLS, never exposes your location to other probe operators. Check current probe coverage before citing country or domain counts.

Related

  • /probes — Voidly probe network status + install instructions
  • /methodology — full data pipeline including external-source fallbacks
  • /atlas/methods — how blocking is detected (DNS, SNI, TCP RST, etc.)