No publishable score in this snapshot. Missing coverage does not establish freedom.
050100
Measurements in window
Unavailable
Original snapshot rank
Unranked
Snapshot fetched
Outside the scored OONI profile
Understand the backdrop.
Available source records for Burundi are shown with their dates and measurement limits. An absent score does not imply unrestricted internet access.
This source branch has no complete scored OONI editorial profile. Current incident and model sources remain independently available.
Country narrative, score basis and historical source
The original site falls back to the country API and incident records for Burundi. No unique OONI editorial narrative is available in that branch.
Editorial text is preserved as source context. Product recommendations do not guarantee unrestricted access. The source tier may differ from the measured score because the two have different definitions.
Score window: Unavailable days. Snapshot fetched . Content first seen . Upstream serve-time . These timestamps do not date the all-time OONI observations.
All-time measurements accumulate from an older source file without an observation window or timestamp. The all-time blocked ratio is not the confidence-shrunk score. Zero counts and absent fields are kept distinct.
Stored protocol counts · separate historical fields
Web
0
Telegram
0
WhatsApp
0
No collection date or complete-country coverage claim is attached to this archive. Protocol fields can be incomplete and need not sum to the historical total.
IODA detected significant connectivity drop in Burundi. 1 critical alerts recorded.
Type disruptionStatus activeSeverity critical
Statuses come from each record; “active” is not inferred from severity or an absent end date. Incident confidence is a source field, not independent certainty that censorship occurred.
Evidence sources, query scope and dates
ioda: named by 10 returned incident records
This is the source mix in the latest returned incident sample, not independent corroboration of the country score. A record can name multiple sources; the counts can overlap.
Dataset version: 2026.09.09. Malformed rows omitted: 0. All readable returned records appear above; each links to its complete evidence and citation page.
Country-origin probe records: Unavailable. Flagged in that sample: Unavailable (Unavailable). The probe-stats endpoint reports degraded data. Country counts are unavailable.
Global core + community active nodes: Unavailable. Core active nodes: Unavailable. Global probes in the last 24 hours: Unavailable. Network source updated: Date unavailable.
Global infrastructure totals do not prove that this country was tested from every location. A node’s reported status and country reflect network infrastructure, not national internet freedom.
No country-origin nodes were returned in this network response.
A censorship or connectivity event within seven days of the model’s as-of date, relative to the country’s baseline. It does not predict an exact shutdown date or measure standing freedom.
Model: fallback Model as-of date: Date unavailable
The model does not report coverage for this country.
7-day model, legacy trajectory and full source
Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
The returned daily shape belongs to legacy v1. It is not independently validated and does not describe the honest 7-day headline model above. Its peak day, fixed confidence and interval must not be attached to that headline.
Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
Similarity here is BEHAVIORAL, not political. Two countries are near each other because they BLOCK in similar ways — comparable method mix, target categories and temporal shape — which does NOT imply comparable governments, laws or intent. A stable democracy with seasonal sports-piracy blocks can sit near an authoritarian state if their measured blocking footprints rhyme. Feature vectors are SPARSE for low-coverage countries (flagged sparse=true, <3 of 5 behavioral feature families populated) — their neighbors are dominated by regime/continent/cohort one-hots and should be read with low confidence. The 2D graph projection (UMAP or PCA) compresses a 32-dimensional space to 2 and loses information — use the cosine `neighbors` list, not pixel distance in the projection, for any quantitative claim.
Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
PROBE SUCCESS != REAL-USER SUCCESS. DPI vendors increasingly rate-limit real client traffic while letting OONI / Voidly synthetic measurement probes through. Success rates here are an UPPER BOUND on what a real user will see.
Recommendations can become stale within hours. Censorship adapts. If a try_first tool stops working, the next probe rotation (cron daily 06:00 UTC) will catch it but you will see it before we do.
'Try first' is NOT 'safe'. It means 'highest measured success rate, highest probe confidence.' Operational security (unique device, throwaway account, no SIM, no DNS leak, etc.) is the USER's responsibility — none of that is captured here.
Domain-fronted tools (Snowflake, Lantern, Psiphon) are SYSTEMATICALLY UNDER-ESTIMATED. Bootstrap-domain probes do not measure the rotating tunnel endpoints those tools actually use.
Self-hosted WireGuard / OpenVPN on a private IP is INVISIBLE to OONI probes and is not represented here. If you have one, trust it over any commercial recommendation.
Tor rows roll up vanilla / obfs4 / Snowflake / Meek transports. Per-transport granularity needs raw OONI nettests, out of scope for v1.
DO NOT share this recommendation as a forum-shareable card without the caveat block. The do_not_share_card_without_caveats flag in the response is on by design.
{
"country_code": "BI",
"do_not_share_card_without_caveats": true,
"endpoints": {
"info": "/v1/atlas/circumvention/info",
"upstream_evasion_table": "/v1/atlas/evasion/BI"
},
"generated_at": "2026-09-08T06:00:05.120012+00:00",
"honest_caveats": [
"PROBE SUCCESS != REAL-USER SUCCESS. DPI vendors increasingly rate-limit real client traffic while letting OONI / Voidly synthetic measurement probes through. Success rates here are an UPPER BOUND on what a real user will see.",
"Recommendations can become stale within hours. Censorship adapts. If a try_first tool stops working, the next probe rotation (cron daily 06:00 UTC) will catch it but you will see it before we do.",
"'Try first' is NOT 'safe'. It means 'highest measured success rate, highest probe confidence.' Operational security (unique device, throwaway account, no SIM, no DNS leak, etc.) is the USER's responsibility — none of that is captured here.",
"Domain-fronted tools (Snowflake, Lantern, Psiphon) are SYSTEMATICALLY UNDER-ESTIMATED. Bootstrap-domain probes do not measure the rotating tunnel endpoints those tools actually use.",
"Self-hosted WireGuard / OpenVPN on a private IP is INVISIBLE to OONI probes and is not represented here. If you have one, trust it over any commercial recommendation.",
"Tor rows roll up vanilla / obfs4 / Snowflake / Meek transports. Per-transport granularity needs raw OONI nettests, out of scope for v1.",
"DO NOT share this recommendation as a forum-shareable card without the caveat block. The do_not_share_card_without_caveats flag in the response is on by design."
],
"informational_disclaimer": "This endpoint is informational, not a safety guarantee. Do not share as a forum-shareable card without the caveat block.",
"insufficient_coverage": true,
"lookback_days": 30,
"n_tools_measured": 0,
"n_total_probes": 0,
"note": "No circumvention-tool probe measurements found for BI in the last 30 days. This usually means OONI probe coverage is absent in BI, NOT that every tool works. We cannot recommend anything for a country we cannot measure.",
"schema": "voidly-circumvention-recommendation/v1",
"tiers": {
"avoid": [],
"fallback": [],
"try_first": []
},
"tools_ranked": []
}
Editorial service list
Know the named targets.
Undated editorial context. Check current evidence before treating a service as blocked.
No editorial blocked-service list is available in this source branch.
The index score snapshot was fetched . Its source serve-time can advance without changes in the underlying scores. The accumulating historical OONI file has no dated observation window.
Current country data, incidents, network state and models have independent source dates. The page requested those sources . It does not continuously refresh. Missing, stale and uncovered responses remain labeled.
GET https://api.voidly.ai/v1/accessibility/check?domain=twitter.com&country=BI
MCP server: npx @voidly/mcp-server
Tool: check_domain_blocked
Arguments: domain="twitter.com", country="BI"
CLI: npx @voidly/cli check twitter.com BI
Inspect the returned timestamp, measurement coverage and method. A sampled result is not a guarantee for every user. API documentation · MCP tools.
How do I cite this Burundi profile?
Use the canonical country URL, https://voidly.ai/bi, with your access date and the date of any source snapshot you quote. The citation below supports plain text and BibTeX copy/download. A model generation or page access date is not a publication date.
Voidly-original analysis is CC BY 4.0. Upstream records keep their own attribution and licenses.
Voidly Research. (n.d.). Burundi Internet Censorship Profile. https://voidly.ai/bi (accessed 2026-09-09).
Citations use the public /bi URL. Access date is not publication date. Cite the individual source, observation time and model version when using a number.
Voidly-original analysis and annotations are CC BY 4.0. Upstream OONI, IODA and Censored Planet records retain their own licenses. Read and attribute the underlying evidence.