Active Incident
Confirmed: censorship detected in Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan · August 31, 2026 · Ongoing
Evidence
75%
Anomaly Rate
3
Measurements
80%
Confidence
What This Means
75% of 3 network tests from Uzbekistan failed to reach these services. Global baseline failure rate is typically 1-3%. This 72+ percentage point difference strongly indicates intentional blocking.
How We Detected This
Data Sourceooni + censoredplanet
ML ModelGradientBoosting v3.3 (LOCO mean F1 0.71, 0.63 on the countries with n≥30)
Confidence Score80% certainty of censorship
Detection TimeAugust 31, 2026
Corroborating Evidence (5)
Evidence collected from multiple independent sources. Upstream claims shown in quotes are not Voidly assertions.
OONIOpen Observatory of Network Interference3 records
middlebox-detection
"OONI http_invalid_request_line: 2/3 measurements anomalous (66.7%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.67
Aug 31, 2026
View source →middlebox-detection
"OONI http_invalid_request_line: 6/8 measurements anomalous (75.0%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.75
Aug 31, 2026
View source →middlebox-detection
"OONI http_invalid_request_line: 6/11 measurements anomalous (54.5%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.55
Aug 31, 2026
View source →Censored PlanetUniversity of Michigan research2 records
http-blocking-timeout
"HTTP blocking (timeout): 2/3 probes blocked (66.7%) for psiphon.ca"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.67
Aug 31, 2026
View source →http-blocking-timeout
"HTTP blocking (timeout): 2/3 probes blocked (66.7%) for tiktok.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.67
Aug 31, 2026
View source →Affected Services (1)
TikTok
Blocked Domains (2)
Click any domain to view raw OONI measurements
What we cannot say
- Who caused it — measurement data alone does not attribute this to any government, ISP, or other actor.
- Intent — anomalous or unreachable measurements indicate interference, not a stated motive or a deliberate-vs-incidental determination.
- Which networks — no specific ASN/ISP is identified for this incident.
- The mechanism — we cannot state whether this was DNS tampering, TLS/SNI reset, an HTTP blockpage, throttling, or an infrastructure outage.
- A confirmed duration — we report the observation window, not a verified start/stop of any block.
- Sub-national scope — measurement is aggregated at the country level; we cannot localize to a province, city, or network segment.
Cite This Incident
Voidly Research. (2026). Confirmed: censorship detected in Uzbekistan [UZ-2026-0327]. Voidly Global Censorship Index. https://voidly.ai/incident/UZ-2026-0327
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