Active Incident
Censorship detected in Russia
Russia · April 10, 2026 · Ongoing
CenAlert detected interference. Impact: 0.7. Reported by: HTTPS blocking (tcp-reset): 131/176 probes blocked (74.4%) for bbc.com.
Evidence
1%
Anomaly Rate
1
Measurements
65%
Confidence
What This Means
1% of tests showed anomalies, above the typical 1-3% baseline. This suggests potential network interference.
How We Detected This
Data Sourcecensoredplanet
ML ModelGradientBoosting v3.3 (LOCO median F1 0.87, honest across 127 countries)
Confidence Score65% certainty of censorship
Detection TimeApril 10, 2026
Corroborating Evidence (5)
Evidence collected from multiple independent sources. Upstream claims shown in quotes are not Voidly assertions.
Censored PlanetUniversity of Michigan research5 records
http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTPS blocking (tcp-reset): 131/176 probes blocked (74.4%) for bbc.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.74
Apr 10, 2026
View source →http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTPS blocking (tcp-reset): 128/174 probes blocked (73.6%) for facebook.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.74
Apr 10, 2026
View source →http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTPS blocking (tcp-reset): 121/174 probes blocked (69.5%) for instagram.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.70
Apr 10, 2026
View source →http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTPS blocking (tcp-reset): 123/173 probes blocked (71.1%) for medium.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.71
Apr 10, 2026
View source →http-blocking-timeout
"HTTPS blocking (timeout): 120/171 probes blocked (70.2%) for whatsapp.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.70
Apr 10, 2026
View source →Affected Services (5)
BBCFacebookInstagramMediumWhatsApp
Blocked Domains (5)
Click any domain to view raw OONI measurements
What we cannot say
- Who caused it — measurement data alone does not attribute this to any government, ISP, or other actor.
- Intent — anomalous or unreachable measurements indicate interference, not a stated motive or a deliberate-vs-incidental determination.
- Which networks — no specific ASN/ISP is identified for this incident.
- The mechanism — we cannot state whether this was DNS tampering, TLS/SNI reset, an HTTP blockpage, throttling, or an infrastructure outage.
- A confirmed duration — we report the observation window, not a verified start/stop of any block.
- Sub-national scope — measurement is aggregated at the country level; we cannot localize to a province, city, or network segment.
- Independent corroboration — this rests on a single source; treat it as a single-source signal, not a multi-source confirmation.
Cite This Incident
Voidly Research. (2026). Censorship detected in Russia [RU-2026-0417]. Voidly Global Censorship Index. https://voidly.ai/incident/RU-2026-0417
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