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Incident record · Rwanda

Internet censorship detected in Rwanda

Type
censorship
Status
suspected
Severity
warning
Inspect evidence Cite this incident

Source summary

CenAlert detected interference. Impact: 0.7. Reported by: HTTPS blocking (tcp-reset): 2/3 probes blocked (66.7%) for medium.com.

Open incident JSON
Reported anomaly rate
0.7%

Source-defined signal; not a universal test-failure percentage.

Source measurement count
1

The record’s count can represent aggregate inputs or alerts.

Incident confidence
65%

A source score, not certainty of intentional censorship.

Linked evidence has its own count and confidence fields. These quantities are not interchangeable.

Follow the evidence

1 linked records.

Inspect the observation, the upstream claim and why it was linked.

Linked observation dates

1 dated · 0 without a verified timezone
Censored Planet1 linked record
Jul 28, 2026 · 00:00 UTCSingle observed timestamp

Each point is a linked record. Horizontal position shows observation time; stacking separates nearby points. The full records below provide the values. This is not a measured outage-duration chart.

Upstream claims are attributed to their source. Multiple records or source names do not by themselves establish independent corroboration.

Censored Planet1 record · open evidence

http-blocking-tcp-reset · elevated

censoredplanet:hyperquack:HTTPS:RW:medium.com:2026-07-28

HTTPS blocking (tcp-reset): 2/3 probes blocked (66.7%) for medium.com

Upstream claim · Censored Planet
Signal value
0.666667
Signal baseline
Unavailable
Evidence confidence
85%
Link confidence
80%

Why it is linked: CenAlert event for same country and date range

Domain
medium.com
Blocking method
tcp-reset
Retrieved
Jul 29, 2026 · 16:27 UTC
Open upstream source
Complete evidence record
{
  "asn": 36890,
  "blockingMethod": "tcp-reset",
  "confidence": 0.85,
  "continent": "Africa",
  "countryCode": "RW",
  "domain": "medium.com",
  "domainCategory": "NEWS",
  "id": 269026606,
  "kind": "http-probe",
  "linkConfidence": 0.8,
  "linkReason": "CenAlert event for same country and date range",
  "observedAt": "2026-07-28T00:00:00Z",
  "probeNodeId": null,
  "regionCode": null,
  "retrievedAt": "2026-07-29T16:27:32.406505Z",
  "riskTier": 3,
  "signalBaseline": null,
  "signalLevel": "elevated",
  "signalType": "http-blocking-tcp-reset",
  "signalValue": 0.6666666666666666,
  "source": "censoredplanet",
  "sourceRef": "censoredplanet:hyperquack:HTTPS:RW:medium.com:2026-07-28",
  "sourceUrl": "https://data.censoredplanet.org",
  "unSubregion": "Eastern Africa",
  "upstreamCause": null,
  "upstreamClaim": "HTTPS blocking (tcp-reset): 2/3 probes blocked (66.7%) for medium.com",
  "upstreamSeverity": null
}
Source-reported corroboration

The source’s corroboration assessment is separate from incident confidence and evidence-link confidence. Inspect its source list, count and description.

{
  "description": "Single source: censoredplanet",
  "evidenceCount": 1,
  "level": "low",
  "score": 0.6,
  "sourceCount": 1,
  "sources": [
    "censoredplanet"
  ]
}

Declared incident sources: Censored Planet.

This record does not list two distinct sources. Treat it as a single-source or uncorroborated record.

Scope and attribution

What the record names.

Methodology

Affected services

Medium

Incident mechanism

TCP/RST injection

Individual evidence may carry more specific methods. Those do not automatically describe the entire incident.

Affected domains · 1

Domains named by the source record. Each link opens country-specific OONI measurements; a named domain is not a blanket national-block verdict.

medium.com
Networks and evidence attribution

ASNs named by this source record: AS36890.

This aggregate describes fields literally present in linked evidence. It does not identify who caused an event or prove intent.

{
  "asns_attributed": 1,
  "domains_attributed": 1,
  "methods": [
    {
      "evidence_count": 1,
      "method": "tcp-reset"
    }
  ],
  "note": "Aggregated from this incident's linked evidence rows — only domains, ASNs, and blocking methods the evidence literally records are shown, with the per-item evidence count.",
  "sources": [
    "censoredplanet"
  ],
  "top_asns": [
    {
      "asn": "AS36890",
      "evidence_count": 1
    }
  ],
  "top_domains": [
    {
      "domain": "medium.com",
      "evidence_count": 1
    }
  ]
}
What this record cannot establish

Measurements alone do not attribute an event to a government, ISP or another actor, and do not establish intent. An outage or anomalous result can have several explanations.

The country label is an aggregation scope. It is not a census of every network, city or service. Regional or ASN fields belong to their individual source evidence and should not be expanded into a national claim.

A confirmed duration is not supplied. The source observation window and evidence timestamps do not prove an exact start and stop of blocking.

Signal definitions, baseline rates and model versions depend on the source. This record does not establish a common baseline or calibrated certainty. Use the source’s specific signal definition and evaluation before interpreting a score.

Inspect measurement coverage

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Use the permanent published URL.
The original source title is preserved.

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The record over time.

Created
2026-07-29 18:00:08.667579 · timezone unspecified
Last updated
2026-07-29 18:00:08.667579 · timezone unspecified
Revision
1
Revision history and original fields

Revision-history array unavailable.

Canonical ID: RW-2026-0017. Source ID: RW-2026-0017. Hash ID: 6110b2fa96dd.

Additional source duration field: 0 hours. It is retained separately from the minutes field and does not establish a verified event duration.

Complete source JSON
{
  "affectedAsns": [
    "AS36890"
  ],
  "affectedDomains": [
    "medium.com"
  ],
  "affectedServices": [
    "Medium"
  ],
  "anomalyRate": 0.006666666666666666,
  "attribution": {
    "asns_attributed": 1,
    "domains_attributed": 1,
    "methods": [
      {
        "evidence_count": 1,
        "method": "tcp-reset"
      }
    ],
    "note": "Aggregated from this incident's linked evidence rows — only domains, ASNs, and blocking methods the evidence literally records are shown, with the per-item evidence count.",
    "sources": [
      "censoredplanet"
    ],
    "top_asns": [
      {
        "asn": "AS36890",
        "evidence_count": 1
      }
    ],
    "top_domains": [
      {
        "domain": "medium.com",
        "evidence_count": 1
      }
    ]
  },
  "confidence": 0.65,
  "corroboration": {
    "description": "Single source: censoredplanet",
    "evidenceCount": 1,
    "level": "low",
    "score": 0.6,
    "sourceCount": 1,
    "sources": [
      "censoredplanet"
    ]
  },
  "country": "RW",
  "countryName": "Rwanda",
  "createdAt": "2026-07-29T18:00:08.667579",
  "description": "CenAlert detected interference. Impact: 0.7. Reported by: HTTPS blocking (tcp-reset): 2/3 probes blocked (66.7%) for medium.com.",
  "duration": null,
  "durationHours": 0,
  "endTime": null,
  "evidence": [
    {
      "asn": 36890,
      "blockingMethod": "tcp-reset",
      "confidence": 0.85,
      "continent": "Africa",
      "countryCode": "RW",
      "domain": "medium.com",
      "domainCategory": "NEWS",
      "id": 269026606,
      "kind": "http-probe",
      "linkConfidence": 0.8,
      "linkReason": "CenAlert event for same country and date range",
      "observedAt": "2026-07-28T00:00:00Z",
      "probeNodeId": null,
      "regionCode": null,
      "retrievedAt": "2026-07-29T16:27:32.406505Z",
      "riskTier": 3,
      "signalBaseline": null,
      "signalLevel": "elevated",
      "signalType": "http-blocking-tcp-reset",
      "signalValue": 0.6666666666666666,
      "source": "censoredplanet",
      "sourceRef": "censoredplanet:hyperquack:HTTPS:RW:medium.com:2026-07-28",
      "sourceUrl": "https://data.censoredplanet.org",
      "unSubregion": "Eastern Africa",
      "upstreamCause": null,
      "upstreamClaim": "HTTPS blocking (tcp-reset): 2/3 probes blocked (66.7%) for medium.com",
      "upstreamSeverity": null
    }
  ],
  "evidenceCount": 1,
  "evidenceSourceBreakdown": {
    "censoredplanet": 1
  },
  "evidenceSpan": {
    "earliest": "2026-07-28T00:00:00Z",
    "latest": "2026-07-28T00:00:00Z"
  },
  "flag": "🇷🇼",
  "generated_at_utc": "2026-09-21T21:34:37.194868Z",
  "hashId": "6110b2fa96dd",
  "id": "RW-2026-0017",
  "incidentType": "censorship",
  "measurementCount": 1,
  "mechanism": "TCP/RST injection",
  "readableId": "RW-2026-0017",
  "reportUrl": "https://api.voidly.ai/data/incidents/6110b2fa96dd/report?format=markdown",
  "revision": 1,
  "severity": "warning",
  "severityGrade": "B",
  "sources": [
    "censoredplanet"
  ],
  "startTime": "2026-07-28T00:00:00Z",
  "status": "suspected",
  "title": "Internet censorship detected in Rwanda",
  "updatedAt": "2026-07-29T18:00:08.667579"
}
All Rwanda incidents
Sep 17, 2026 · disruptionInternet connectivity disruption in RwandaSep 13, 2026 · disruptionInternet connectivity disruption in RwandaAug 21, 2026 · censorshipCensorship detected in RWAug 10, 2026 · disruptionInternet connectivity disruption in RwandaAug 8, 2026 · disruptionInternet connectivity disruption in RwandaAug 7, 2026 · disruptionInternet connectivity disruption in Rwanda
More with the same mechanism · TCP/RST injection
May 8, 2026Internet censorship detected in RwandaApr 28, 2026Internet censorship detected in RwandaApr 17, 2026Internet censorship detected in RwandaApr 14, 2026Internet censorship detected in RwandaApr 10, 2026Internet censorship detected in Rwanda

Related records come from up to 100 recent records in the same country. They do not establish a causal connection.

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