Active Incident
Confirmed: censorship detected in Iran
Iran · July 30, 2026 · Ongoing
Evidence
100%
Anomaly Rate
16
Measurements
90%
Confidence
What This Means
100% of 16 network tests from Iran failed to reach these services. Global baseline failure rate is typically 1-3%. This 97+ percentage point difference strongly indicates intentional blocking.
How We Detected This
Data Sourceooni + censoredplanet
ML ModelGradientBoosting v3.3 (LOCO mean F1 0.711, honest across 131 countries)
Confidence Score90% certainty of censorship
Detection TimeJuly 30, 2026
Corroborating Evidence (18)
Evidence collected from multiple independent sources. Upstream claims shown in quotes are not Voidly assertions.
OONIOpen Observatory of Network Interference16 records
blocking
"OONI signal: 34/35 measurements anomalous (97.1%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.97
Jul 30, 2026
View source →blocking
"OONI whatsapp: 37/39 measurements anomalous (94.9%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.95
Jul 30, 2026
View source →blocking
"OONI telegram: 37/39 measurements anomalous (94.9%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.95
Jul 30, 2026
View source →blocking
"OONI facebook_messenger: 34/38 measurements anomalous (89.5%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.89
Jul 30, 2026
View source →blocking
"OONI signal: 34/35 measurements anomalous (97.1%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.97
Jul 30, 2026
View source →+ 11 more OONI records
Censored PlanetUniversity of Michigan research2 records
http-blocking-timeout
"HTTP blocking (timeout): 4/7 probes blocked (57.1%) for bbc.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.57
Jul 30, 2026
View source →http-blocking-timeout
"HTTP blocking (timeout): 4/7 probes blocked (57.1%) for facebook.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.57
Jul 30, 2026
View source →Affected Services (4)
Facebook MessengerSignalTelegramWhatsApp
What we cannot say
- Who caused it — measurement data alone does not attribute this to any government, ISP, or other actor.
- Intent — anomalous or unreachable measurements indicate interference, not a stated motive or a deliberate-vs-incidental determination.
- Which networks — no specific ASN/ISP is identified for this incident.
- The mechanism — we cannot state whether this was DNS tampering, TLS/SNI reset, an HTTP blockpage, throttling, or an infrastructure outage.
- A confirmed duration — we report the observation window, not a verified start/stop of any block.
- Sub-national scope — measurement is aggregated at the country level; we cannot localize to a province, city, or network segment.
Cite This Incident
Voidly Research. (2026). Confirmed: censorship detected in Iran [IR-2026-2326]. Voidly Global Censorship Index. https://voidly.ai/incident/IR-2026-2326
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