Active Incident
Confirmed: hTTP blocking in Myanmar: facebook.com, instagram.com
Myanmar · February 8, 2026 · 23 hours
CensoredPlanet Hyperquack detected HTTP/HTTPS blocking for 2 domains
Evidence
71%
Anomaly Rate
2
Measurements
85%
Confidence
What This Means
71% of 2 network tests from Myanmar failed to reach these services. Global baseline failure rate is typically 1-3%. This 68+ percentage point difference strongly indicates intentional blocking.
How We Detected This
Data Sourcecensoredplanet
ML ModelGradientBoosting v3.3 (LOCO median F1 0.87, honest across 127 countries)
Confidence Score85% certainty of censorship
Detection TimeFebruary 8, 2026
Corroborating Evidence (5)
Evidence collected from multiple independent sources. Upstream claims shown in quotes are not Voidly assertions.
Censored PlanetUniversity of Michigan research5 records
http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTP blocking (tcp-reset): 5/7 probes blocked (71.4%) for facebook.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.71
Feb 8, 2026
View source →http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTP blocking (tcp-reset): 4/7 probes blocked (57.1%) for instagram.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.57
Feb 8, 2026
View source →http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTP blocking (tcp-reset): 3/7 probes blocked (42.9%) for signal.org"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.43
Feb 8, 2026
View source →http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTP blocking (tcp-reset): 3/7 probes blocked (42.9%) for twitter.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.43
Feb 8, 2026
View source →http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTP blocking (tcp-reset): 3/7 probes blocked (42.9%) for whatsapp.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.43
Feb 8, 2026
View source →Affected Services (6)
FacebookInstagramSignalTwitter/XWhatsAppX
Blocked Domains (5)
Click any domain to view raw OONI measurements
What we cannot say
- Who caused it — measurement data alone does not attribute this to any government, ISP, or other actor.
- Intent — anomalous or unreachable measurements indicate interference, not a stated motive or a deliberate-vs-incidental determination.
- Which networks — no specific ASN/ISP is identified for this incident.
- The mechanism — we cannot state whether this was DNS tampering, TLS/SNI reset, an HTTP blockpage, throttling, or an infrastructure outage.
- Sub-national scope — measurement is aggregated at the country level; we cannot localize to a province, city, or network segment.
- Independent corroboration — this rests on a single source; treat it as a single-source signal, not a multi-source confirmation.
Cite This Incident
Voidly Research. (2026). Confirmed: hTTP blocking in Myanmar: facebook.com, instagram.com [MM-2026-0008]. Voidly Global Censorship Index. https://voidly.ai/incident/MM-2026-0008
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