TH Thailand
5 citable censorship incidents in the past 365 days. Below: top countries that LEAD this country’s daily incident pattern, and the top countries IT LEADS, ranked by |r|.
Led by
When these countries spike, TH spikes lag days later.
| Country | Lag | r | p (FDR) |
|---|---|---|---|
| SA Saudi Arabia | +1d | +0.912 | <1e-6 |
| AE United Arab Emirates | +1d | +0.756 | <1e-6 |
| QA Qatar | +1d | +0.665 | <1e-6 |
| IR Iran | +21d | +0.597 | <1e-6 |
| IQ Iraq | +22d | +0.573 | <1e-6 |
Leads
When TH spikes, these countries spike lag days later.
| Country | Lag | r | p (FDR) |
|---|---|---|---|
| KZ Kazakhstan | +1d | +0.749 | <1e-6 |
| PK Pakistan | +26d | +0.567 | <1e-6 |
| UZ Uzbekistan | +12d | +0.469 | <1e-6 |
| VN Vietnam | +4d | +0.463 | <1e-6 |
| SY Syria | +28d | +0.446 | <1e-6 |
Cross-correlation does NOT imply causation. Significant lead/lag pairs may reflect (a) one country influencing another, (b) shared regional or geopolitical drivers (elections, sanctions, fiber routes), or (c) downstream measurement effects from overlapping ISP infrastructure. lag=0 (simultaneous) is intentionally excluded -- see /atlas/correlation-matrix for that case. With 50 countries and 31 lags evaluated per pair, the raw p-values overstate significance; we apply Benjamini-Hochberg FDR control at alpha=0.05 and require |r| >= 0.4. Counts come from the citable-censorship subset (incident_type IN censorship/mixed) -- IODA disruption rows are excluded since they include fiber cuts / weather / DDoS.