TZ Tanzania
17 citable censorship incidents in the past 365 days. Below: top countries that LEAD this country’s daily incident pattern, and the top countries IT LEADS, ranked by |r|.
Led by
When these countries spike, TZ spikes lag days later.
| Country | Lag | r | p (FDR) |
|---|---|---|---|
| MM Myanmar | +30d | +0.726 | <1e-6 |
| PK Pakistan | +30d | +0.716 | <1e-6 |
| RW Rwanda | +1d | +0.647 | <1e-6 |
| SY Syria | +1d | +0.581 | <1e-6 |
| BY Belarus | +3d | +0.575 | <1e-6 |
Leads
When TZ spikes, these countries spike lag days later.
| Country | Lag | r | p (FDR) |
|---|---|---|---|
| AZ Azerbaijan | +2d | +0.836 | <1e-6 |
| JO Jordan | +5d | +0.735 | <1e-6 |
| MA Morocco | +30d | +0.653 | <1e-6 |
| UZ Uzbekistan | +1d | +0.628 | <1e-6 |
| EG Egypt | +2d | +0.403 | <1e-6 |
Cross-correlation does NOT imply causation. Significant lead/lag pairs may reflect (a) one country influencing another, (b) shared regional or geopolitical drivers (elections, sanctions, fiber routes), or (c) downstream measurement effects from overlapping ISP infrastructure. lag=0 (simultaneous) is intentionally excluded -- see /atlas/correlation-matrix for that case. With 50 countries and 31 lags evaluated per pair, the raw p-values overstate significance; we apply Benjamini-Hochberg FDR control at alpha=0.05 and require |r| >= 0.4. Counts come from the citable-censorship subset (incident_type IN censorship/mixed) -- IODA disruption rows are excluded since they include fiber cuts / weather / DDoS.