BY Belarus
6 citable censorship incidents in the past 365 days. Below: top countries that LEAD this country’s daily incident pattern, and the top countries IT LEADS, ranked by |r|.
Led by
When these countries spike, BY spikes lag days later.
| Country | Lag | r | p (FDR) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RW Rwanda | +5d | +0.648 | <1e-6 |
| SY Syria | +1d | +0.592 | <1e-6 |
| RU Russia | +27d | +0.449 | <1e-6 |
| PK Pakistan | +26d | +0.448 | <1e-6 |
Leads
When BY spikes, these countries spike lag days later.
| Country | Lag | r | p (FDR) |
|---|---|---|---|
| MA Morocco | +29d | +0.663 | <1e-6 |
| EG Egypt | +1d | +0.634 | <1e-6 |
| TZ Tanzania | +3d | +0.575 | <1e-6 |
| UZ Uzbekistan | +14d | +0.489 | <1e-6 |
| AZ Azerbaijan | +4d | +0.480 | <1e-6 |
Cross-correlation does NOT imply causation. Significant lead/lag pairs may reflect (a) one country influencing another, (b) shared regional or geopolitical drivers (elections, sanctions, fiber routes), or (c) downstream measurement effects from overlapping ISP infrastructure. lag=0 (simultaneous) is intentionally excluded -- see /atlas/correlation-matrix for that case. With 50 countries and 31 lags evaluated per pair, the raw p-values overstate significance; we apply Benjamini-Hochberg FDR control at alpha=0.05 and require |r| >= 0.4. Counts come from the citable-censorship subset (incident_type IN censorship/mixed) -- IODA disruption rows are excluded since they include fiber cuts / weather / DDoS.