Two ways to censor a network: VPN-blockers vs news-blockers

Volume hides intent: two networks can block the same AMOUNT and be doing opposite things. Voidly's new per-ISP category view (/v1/measurement/isp-categories) shows the SHAPE of a network's blocking, not just its size. Across 86 networks with enough categorised measurements, most block bluntly across the board — Venezuela's state AS8048 blocks 100% of measured domains in all nine categories (news 158/158, gambling 182/182, circumvention 90/90). But the 8 networks that block SELECTIVELY (a 40+ point gap between their most- and least-blocked category) reveal two mirror-image strategies. KZ AS207446 is a VPN-BLOCKER: 94% of circumvention tools blocked (46/49) but 0% of news (0/6) and gambling — censorship aimed at stopping people from routing around it. RU AS47541 is the OPPOSITE, a NEWS-BLOCKER: 100% of news (64/64) and communication tools blocked but only 9% of circumvention tools (5/54) — censorship aimed at controlling the message, escape hatch left open. The shape is practical: in a news-blocker a VPN probably works; in a VPN-blocker it probably won't — a volume-only ranking would call both 'moderate'. HONEST CAVEATS: block rate is over MEASURED domains per category (absence = unmeasured, not allowed); some cells are thin (KZ news/gambling n=6 each; the circumvention signal n=49 and the RU contrast n=54/64 are robust — always read the per-category count); ASN-tagged evidence skews toward CensoredPlanet DNS measurements that over-represent blocked endpoints, so most networks read 'blanket' and selective detection is a conservative floor; this is observed blocking shape, not attribution of policy to a named operator. Live: /v1/measurement/isp-categories?country=KZ&asn=207446.