The whole public surface is one task carrying no money.
The browser pins the provider, sends the task once, and after an ambiguous reply asks for status rather than sending again.
No wallet, credit ledger, marketplace, deposit, withdrawal, bridge, x402 settlement or mainnet execution is part of this release. Do not send funds, and do not test historical addresses or contracts.
A payment cut to one job.
It fits that job and nothing else.
one key · one job · every other lock is a different cut
We are not guessing at how these get stolen.
A published security analysis of live x402 deployments names four implementation-layer flaw classes, reaching, in the authors’ words, “resource-leakage ratios up to 100%” against the official Coinbase SDKs and a production deployment.
- one payment reused on a different jobcross-resource substitution
- the same payment counted twiceduplicate-settlement race
- more money taken than was agreedallowance overdraft
- the payment stopped from ever landingdenial of settlement
So we took their list as ours, and attacked our own money path.
- a payment for a different jobcross-resource substitution
- a second job, free
- Refused
- one unit short
- the job, underpaid
- Refused
- the money pulled straight back out
- the job, then a reversal
- Refused
- a different token than the one agreed
- the job, in something worthless
- Refused
- two payment authorizations in one transactionduplicate-settlement race
- one job, paid once, opened twice
- Refused
- a payment one confirmation too shallow
- a job that was never finally paid for
- Refused
- a receipt belonging to some other transaction
- somebody else's receipt, reused
- Refused
- a payment sent by someone other than the signer
- a payment nobody signed for
- Refused
The two amber rows answer a flaw class named in the analysis above, by its own name. The other six are ours.
87 checks · 87 passed · 8 bad payments refused. Every record published, with the name of the assertion that produced it.
Against the real USDC contract, on a private copy of the live network. No real money moved · 2026-08-21
The payer never has to hold a network fee, because somebody else pays it.
In every window anyone has scanned, the account that proves it has sent nothing to anybody but itself.
There is nowhere for the money to stop.
In this money path there is no account with your money in it.
- Open an account with the middleman.identity checks, approval, waiting
- Fund it.on someone else's balance sheet
- He holds it while the work happens.he can freeze it, lose it, or be ordered to release it
- He decides the job is done.a third party judges work it never saw
- He releases it, minus a cut.you pay for not trusting
- The payer pays the worker directly, on the public record.
- We read that record and hand over the key.
- NO FLOAT
- Money never rests here, so there is nothing to reconcile and nothing to lose in a breach.
- NO BALANCES
- You have no account with us in this path, so there is none for anyone to freeze.
- NO UNIT OF OURS
- Nothing of ours stands between payer and worker, so there is nowhere for a cut to land.
- NO OVERRIDE
- No account, no balance and no vault exist in this path, so there is nothing for an administrative action, ours or anyone else’s, to act on. Not a power we withhold. A power with nothing to act on.
OpenAI and Stripe launched checkout inside ChatGPT in September 2025. When it reached Shopify merchants in January 2026 they were reported to pay OpenAI a four percent fee on those sales. OpenAI pulled back on 4 March 2026.
“OpenAI is not the merchant of record in the Agentic Commerce Protocol.”
OpenAI, Agentic Commerce Protocol documentation
Every absence above is scoped to this money path and not to the company. Voidpay v1 also has an internal credit unit and mints balances of it; those credits are not money, are not backed by anything, and cannot be redeemed or converted.
Six conditions, then a one-way door.
The routes that would move real value answer with a hard refusal at the edge. They stay dark until every condition below is met, because switching them on cannot be undone.
- 01PRODUCTION SIGNING AUTHORITY IN HARDWAREImplemented and tested against a mock. The external authority is not provisioned, and the runbook says NO-GO in its first line.
- 02INDEPENDENT REVIEWAn outside read of the money path. When it is commissioned, the reviewer is named here.
- 03REHEARSED ROLLBACKA timed, recorded reversal against a live release.
- 04TESTNET CANARYOne internal resource, a price of one micro-USDC, ten quotes a day, three independent observers, and a quote lifetime deliberately shorter than the authorisation window. Implemented, isolated, not armed.
- 05MAINNET CANARYDepends on the two above.
- 06RECONCILIATIONDepends on a canary that has produced a receipt worth reconciling.
no date is published for any of the six · a date would be a promise
The production settlement adapter is written and unconfigured. It is the last switch, not a missing piece.
Tell us before you tell anybody else.
Email security@voidly.ai with impact, reproduction steps, the affected endpoint or release id, and a minimal safe proof. Remove secrets, sealed payloads and personal data.
- 01Use only identities, briefs and browser profiles you control.
- 02Do not degrade service, exfiltrate data, or reach another reader’s records.
- 03Stop after proving the minimum impact, and report privately.
- 04Never include vault material, capability material or raw sealed payloads.