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Per-mobile-carrier blocking detector: splitting censorship severity by mobile carrier vs fixed broadband

Internet access is not one thing. In much of the Global South the cheap, dominant path online is a mobile carrier — a SIM and a cellular data plan — while fixed broadband (FTTH, cable, DSL) reaches a smaller, often wealthier slice of the population. Censors know this: mobile DPI is operationally…

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Internet access is not one thing. In much of the Global South the cheap, dominant path online is a mobile carrier — a SIM and a cellular data plan — while fixed broadband (FTTH, cable, DSL) reaches a smaller, often wealthier slice of the population. Censors know this: mobile DPI is operationally easier to deploy and update than fixed-line interception, and blocking the mobile path hits the most people for the least effort, so several regimes block mobile-first. The per-mobile-carrier blocking detector makes that split visible. It takes a hand-curated map of 62 telco ASNs — 34 tagged mobile, 24 tagged broadband, 4 tagged mixed — and, per country over the trailing 90 days, splits the evidence table's CensoredPlanet blocking observations by access type. The headline number is mobile_skew: how much harder HTTP-level blocking lands on a country's mobile carriers than on its fixed broadband. The metric is HTTP-only on purpose. Every ASN-tagged evidence row is already a blocking observation, so a classic block rate (blocks / all measurements) is degenerate — always 1.0. And dns-blocking rows saturate signal_value at exactly 1.0 while http-blocking rows carry a real intensity in [0,1] (the fraction of probes that saw the block), and CensoredPlanet typically probes a given ASN with either its DNS satellite or its HTTP hyperquack, not both — so mixing DNS and HTTP rows would make any mean intensity an artifact of the probe-protocol mix rather than of how hard the carrier is blocked. So mobile_skew = mobile_http_intensity / (broadband_http_intensity + epsilon), computed on HTTP rows only, an apples-to-apples comparison; skew above 1.15 on a trusted country (>=20 HTTP-block rows on each access type) is the mobile-first signature. DNS blocking is reported separately as a per-side binary side-channel because DNS rows carry no usable intensity gradient; the 4 mixed ASNs (incumbent telcos running both networks at scale) are excluded from the skew math. The first run is honestly a thin one and the artifact says so: across the 90-day window 29 countries had blocking evidence on a classified telco ASN, but only Singapore currently has enough HTTP-block rows on both a mobile and a broadband ASN to support the headline skew — SG lands at mobile_skew 0.896 (mobile HTTP intensity 0.064, broadband 0.022), roughly balanced with a slight broadband lean. The other 28 countries are probed DNS-only or HTTP-only on one side, get mobile_skew=null, and surface only via the DNS side-channel — which still cleanly separates where DNS-level blocking is observed on the mobile path (Bahrain, India, Jordan, plus mobile-and-broadband-both in Bangladesh and Indonesia) from where it shows up only on fixed broadband (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt). Honest caveats baked into every response: the ASN-to-type map is hand-curated and incomplete (only ASNs present in the evidence table are classified, the rest are unknown); some incumbent telcos genuinely run both networks and are tagged mixed and dropped rather than guessed at; the headline skew needs HTTP-block rows on both access types and CensoredPlanet vantage-point assignment means that holds for one country today (it widens as probe coverage grows); and this measures blocking severity, not prevalence — every classified ASN is blocked, the question is how hard and on which access type. Wired as a per-country reference surface, not a model input. Live at GET /v1/atlas/mobile-carrier-blocking/{cc} + /leaderboard + /info. Built by scripts/build-mobile-carrier-blocking.py.

What this is

Internet access is not one thing. In much of the Global South the cheap, dominant way online is a mobile carrier — a SIM card and a cellular data plan — while fixed broadband (FTTH, cable, DSL) reaches a smaller, often wealthier slice of the population. Censors know this. Mobile DPI is operationally easier to deploy and update than fixed-line interception, and blocking the mobile path hits the most people for the least effort. Several regimes block mobile-first.

The per-mobile-carrier blocking detector (scripts/build-mobile-carrier-blocking.py) makes that split visible. It takes a hand-curated map of 62 telco ASNs — 34 tagged mobile, 24 tagged broadband, 4 tagged mixed — and, per country over the trailing 90 days, splits the evidence table's blocking observations by access type. The headline number is mobile_skew: how much harder HTTP-level blocking lands on a country's mobile carriers than on its fixed broadband.

Why the headline metric is HTTP-only

Every ASN-tagged row in the evidence table is a CensoredPlanet blocking observation — there are no clean-measurement rows on these ASNs, so a classic block rate (blocks ÷ all measurements) is degenerate, always 1.0. Two facts shape the real method. First, dns-blocking rows saturate their signal_value at exactly 1.0, while http-blocking rows carry a genuine intensity in [0,1] — the fraction of probes that saw the block. Second, CensoredPlanet typically probes a given ASN with either its DNS satellite or its HTTP hyperquack, not both. Mixing DNS and HTTP rows would make any “mean intensity” an artifact of the probe-protocol mix rather than of how hard the carrier is blocked.

So the headline mobile_skew is computed on HTTP rows only — an apples-to-apples comparison: mobile_skew = mobile_http_intensity / (broadband_http_intensity + ε). A skew above 1.15 on a trusted country (one with at least 20 HTTP-block rows on each access type) is the mobile-first signature. DNS blocking is reported separately as a per-side binary side-channel — observed or not — because DNS rows carry no usable intensity gradient. The 4 mixed ASNs (incumbent telcos running both networks at scale) are excluded from the skew math entirely.

What the first run found

Across the 90-day window, 29 countries had blocking evidence on at least one classified telco ASN. The honest result is a thin one: only Singapore currently has enough HTTP-block rows on both a mobile ASN and a broadband ASN to support the headline skew — SG comes in at mobile_skew = 0.896 (mobile HTTP intensity 0.064, broadband 0.022), i.e. roughly balanced with a slight broadband lean. The other 28 countries are probed DNS-only or HTTP-only on one side, so they get mobile_skew = null and only the DNS side-channel is populated.

That side-channel is still informative. It cleanly separates where DNS-level blocking is observed on the mobile path (Bahrain, India, Jordan, plus mobile-and-broadband-both in Bangladesh and Indonesia) from where it shows up only on fixed broadband (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt). The detector is wired as a per-country reference surface, not a model input: GET /v1/atlas/mobile-carrier-blocking/<cc>, /leaderboard, and /info (which returns the full ASN→type map).

Honest caveats

The ASN→type map is hand-curated and incomplete — only ASNs that actually appear in the evidence table were worth classifying; everything else is unknown and excluded from the math. Some incumbent telcos genuinely run both a mobile and a fixed-broadband network; those are tagged mixed and dropped from the skew rather than guessed at. The headline skew needs HTTP-block rows on both access types in the same country, and CensoredPlanet's vantage-point assignment means that condition is met for only one country today — this will widen as probe coverage grows, but the v1 result is honestly one trusted data point plus a DNS side-channel. Finally, this measures blocking severity, not prevalence: every classified ASN here is blocked; the question the detector answers is how hard, and on which access type. Evidence volume per ASN reflects which vantage points CensoredPlanet happens to probe — it is not a census of national traffic.

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